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Abstract: Here we demonstrate the models formation and research findings of the 
Replicator Dynamics that interpret the evolutionary process, also the discussion about 
problem with the models which are commonly used in evolutionary game theory, i.e. 
the difference between the fitness of population  following a certain strategy and the 
average fitness of the entire population determine the change of population proportion 
following the strategy between generations, that is to say what happen after one bout 
are used to interpret the phenomena before the bout. As a modification, we construct a 
model directly with the numbers of the population following a certain strategy 
between generations, and prove the characteristics of its key can be discussed 
according to the model. 
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Résumé: Ici, nous démontrons la formation des modèles et la conclusion de la 
recherche de la dynamique de la reproduction qui interprète le procès évolutionniste, 
et aussi la discussion sur le problème avec les modèles qui sont communément utilisés 
dans la théorie du jeu évolutionniste, c.-à-d. la différence entre l’aptitude de la 
population suivant une certaine stratégie et l’aptitude en moyenne de la toute la 
population déterminent le changement de la proportion de la population suivant la 
stratégie parmi les générations, c’est-à-dire ce qui se passe après un accès sont utilisé 
pour interpréter les phénomènes avant un accès. Comme une modification, nous 
construisons un modèle directement avec les nombres de la population selon une 
certaine stratégie parmi les générations, et prouvent que les caractéristiques de leur 
clé peuvent être discuté d’après le modèle. 
Mots-Clés: adaptation, dynamique évolutionniste, dynamique de reproduction 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In R. A. Fisher’s attempt [see The Genetic Theory of Natural Selection (1930)] to explain the 
approximate equality of the sex ratio in mammals, he found the “fixed point” that the 
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evolutionary dynamics leads to a stable situation. Fisher's argument can be understood as the 
initial work of evolutionary game theory, but he did not state it in those terms. After that, there 
are two approaches to evolutionary game theory in generalized models structuring. One is 
Taylor and Jonker’s (1978) Replicator Dynamical model (hereinafter referred to as RD). The 
other derives from the work of Maynard Smith and Price, i.e. the concept of an evolutionarily 
stable strategy. The latter focuses on stable conditions of dynamical process, while the former 
attempts to reveal the dynamical process of the evolutionary system that leads to a stable 
situation. 
Taylor and Jonker’s (1978) pioneering attempt stimulates widespread studies and 
applications of Replicator Dynamics and fitness in the framework of evolutionary economics. 
T. Day and P. D. Taylor (2003) followed Maynard Smith’s (1982) approach to fitness, and 
applied it to their model of Replicator Dynamics. H. Gintis (1999) took a similar approach in 
his model. J. M. Alexander (2003) attempted to link ESS and Replicator Dynamics. 
The aforesaid studies carry forward the thought of dynamical adaptation, and focus on the 
interpretation of dynamical evolution mechanism. 
The clue of interpretation about the evolutionary mechanism must be the individual 
adaptation, but there have been long-standing debates over adaptation (Dobzhansky, 1977；
Knoll and Niklas, 1987). Evolutionary biology makes it clear that whether adaptation is a 
process or a situation, the result should be an individul or a population’s contrbution to the 
breeding of the population during the natural selection process, and hence the adaptive value or 
fitness in the environment can be obtained. Evolutionary game is first used to interpret the 
ecological phenomenon that individuals accept natural selection and adapt to their enviroment, 
and then it is referenced by economists in anlysing economic phenomena. The questions arise 
when we approach the Replicator Dynamics from the perspective of dynamical evolution: 
1st. How does Replicator Dynamics reflect the dynamic nature of evolutionary adaptation in 
researchers’ opinion when they use the model?   
2nd. According to requirements of models interpreting dynamical mechanism, is the concept 
“fitness” 2 in Replicator Dynamics, methodologically valid? 
3rd. Without applying the difference between the fitness of population (or expected payoff 
value) following a certain strategy and the average fitness of the entire population to Replicator 
Dynamics, can we discuss the characteristics of the equation’s key?  
Considering the questions raised, we review the models formation and research findings of 
the Replicator Dynamics that interpret the evolutionary process, also the discussion about the 
problem with the models which are commonly used in evolutionary game theory. We then 
directly construct a model with the numbers of the population following a certain strategy 
between generations, attempt to prove the characteristics of its key (the nature of evolutionary 
dynamics) which can be discussed according to the model instead of using the difference 
between the fitness of population following a certain strategy and the average fitness of the 
entire population that determines the change of population proportion following the strategy 
between generations. 
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2.  REPLICATOR DYNAMICS AND ITS CONSECUTION IN 
METHODOLOGY  
 
The formation of RD model symbolizes the shaping of evolutionary game theory. Many game 
theorists have made in-depth studies of the adjusting process of collective behavior, and 
constructed varying dynamical models from different perspectives, such as Weibull’s (1995) 
Imitation Dynamics; Börgers and Sarin’s (1995, 1997) Reinforcement Dynamics and so on. In 
fact the model that is widely accepted and applied is Taylor and Jonker’s (1978) Replicator 
Dynamics. Up to the present, evolutionary game theorists have been inspired by the findings of 
Maynard Smith (1982), Taylor and Jonker (1978). 3 
 
2.1 Research and Review about RD  
Paying particular attention to the standard criteria for evolutionary stability, T. Day and P. D. 
Taylor (2003) looked into similarities between discrete-trait games and continuous-trait games, 
and then attempted to show that the standard evolutionarily stable strategy conditions for 
discrete-trait games can be seen as a special case of the conditions employed in continuous-trait 
games. The general form (continuous-trait games) of adaptive dynamics is expressed as below:  
                             )),(,cov( zzzz W
dt
d =                           (1) 
Where z  denotes the population mean of traits, z denotes a one- or multi-dimensional 
quantitative trait,4 ),( zzW  denotes the individual fitness.5 RD is denoted in discrete-trait 
games as below:  
                  ))(( Wwp
dt
pd
i
i
i −= p ， i =1, . . . , n                        (2)                       
where )(p∑= j jj wpW denotes the average fitness of the entire population, vectors of 
p denote the proportions of different traits, )(piw  denotes the fitness of individuals following 
strategy i , and take ija to be the fitness of an i -strategist against a j -opponent.  
Much of the classical work in evolutionary game theory is based on this fundamental 
assumption, namely, the definition of fitness is just the number replicated. And this is the most 
significant difference between evolutionary games and dynamical games. 
H. Gintis (1999) took a similar approach in his model 
                  )]()([ twtwpp iii −=& ， i =1, . . . , n                        (3) 
where )(twi  denotes the fitness of individuals following one strategy, )(tw denotes the 
average fitness of the entire population, ip denotes the proportion following the strategy (E. S. 
Andersen, 1994 and R. A. Fisher, 1999 use the same description).  
Gintis defines “fitness” as the expected number of offspring, and it depends on a single 
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4 z denotes the sector made up by the possibilities of individuals with continuous-trait(strategy). 
5 The definition of individual fitness adopts the doing of Maynard Smith (1982). 
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genetic locus.6 Although his research was forward-looking at the time, his own idea is lacking 
when he incorporates the fitness in his model. He just follows his predecessors’ thoughts: The 
change of proportion following one strategy depends on the distribution of fitness. 
The aforementioned studies give n kinds of strategies (types or traits), we can conclude that 
they can be reduced to two strategies, which will not affect our discussion about dynamic 
process. Hence, we will discuss J. M. Alexander’s (2003) study employing two strategies, 
typically called "Cooperate" and "Defect" (denoted as C and D). Alexander describes RD as 
below:  
                                 
W
WWp
dt
dp ccc )( −=                         (4) 
where cp  denotes proportion following the strategy C, WC denotes the fitness of 
cooperators,  denotes the average fitness of the entire population. It can be proved that the 
fitness here is just the number ratio between generations (see Part 3).7 He used this model to 
explore whether there is constringency during the dynamical process and the influencing 
factors. 
With regard to studies about dynamical models in the past 30 years, consensus reached in 
this field can be expressed as follows: 
? Noticing that the transformation from (1) to (2) and the disposal with the right side of (3) 
and (4), we can see that the basic precondition of RD is that it take aij in the payoff matrix 
to be the fitness of an i-strategist against a j-opponent, also the number of individuals 
replicated in a bout. 
? The principal notions of characterizing evolutionary mechanism by dynamical equation 
can be summarized as the following: The dynamical change of “the difference between the 
expected payoff value of population following a certain strategy and the average expected 
payoff value of the entire population” determines the change rate of population proportion 
following one strategy between generations. That is to say, the rate of change of 
population proportion following one strategy between generations depends on the 
distribution of “fitness”. 
? The introduction of “fitness” is a key factor, and fitness is assumed in most literature as the 
number of offspring that survives (or replicators), or the ratio of offspring that survives.  
? Comparing the fitness of individuals following one strategy with that of the entire 
population, researchers discuss the fundamental question of dynamical model— whether 
or not there is the eventual constringency during the change between generations? It can 
also be understood that which equilibrium the system will be driven to depends on the 
original state of the system (just the path dependence), and whether the equilibrium is 
stable has something to do with the distribution of traits, proportion and payoff matrix.  
Using the approach, researchers hope to interpret the dynamical process and evolutionary 
tendency between generations (bouts). And they assume that individuals’ payoff just equals 
their growth ratio by replicating themselves after a bout, which implicitly describes a kind of 
learning mechanism. By using differential equation in mathematical technology, the widely 
used model RD which takes aij in the payoff matrix as the consequence misunderstands the 
                                                        
6 At a single genetic locus there are two genes (such creatures, which includes most of the “higher” plants and 
animals, are called diploid). Suppose there are n alternative types of genes (called alleles) at this genetic locus, 
which we label gi，i=1, . . . , n.  An individual whose gene pair is (gi, gj), whom we term an “ij -type,” then has fitness 
wij, which is interpreted as being its probability of surviving to sexual maturity. 
7 Apparently, this is not in consistent in the context because of different definitions of “fitness”. This also shows that 
the term is defined differently though it is applied widely. 
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concept “dynamics”. In the model, the ratio of change of proportion during a bout depends on 
the result after a bout, which is used to explain the situation before the game.  
 
2.2 Review of Methodology 
Biological evolutionism is the source of the idea of evolutionary dynamics. In evolutionary 
game theory, it is assumed that individuals that have limited rationality are unable to respond 
rapidly and appropriately to the environmental change. Rather, individuals, through 
experimenting, imitating and learning, make decisions, which are also influenced by the 
environment. The evolutionary process of individual behavior is studied as an evolutionary 
system over time, so that researchers can interpret the complicated gradual process leading to 
equilibrium.  
Causal interpretation is most frequently employed in the interpretation of evolutionary 
mechanism. Causal interpretation “interprets phenomena or events by pointing out how these 
phenomena or events happen” (J. J. Vromen, 1995). The situation before a bout (i.e. the cause) 
determines the result after the game when dynamical model is used to interpret evolutionary 
phenomenon. Consequently, we examine equation (2), (3) and (4) which are applied to explain 
evolution according to this principle: noticing the right side of (2), (3) and (4), we can find that 
they mean the same thing—difference between the expected payoff value of population 
following a certain strategy and the average expected payoff value of the entire population, or 
that of the “fitness”, which determines the change of population proportion following the 
strategy between generations. Apparently, taking (4) as an example, we can see its right side is 
W
WWc −
 
which is the result individuals get after a bout. Evidently, the result can not explain the cause 
of the phenomenon. “It turns the thing upside down.” as J. J. Vromen put it when he 
commented on the functional interpretation applied in the interpretation of biological evolution. 
A certain phenomenon can only be interpreted by its cause rather than its result. Therefore, we 
can say that the expositive model of RD transposes the cause and the result in the causal 
interpretation. 
Finally, we explore the model in light of the three kinds of mechanism (inheritance, 
selection and mutation) in the natural selection. To all appearances, RD can not present all the 
three mechanisms in evolutionary process. Furthermore, the model does not distinguish 
different mechanisms in its interpretation. The prevalent approach is that individuals in a 
population will learn from those whose payoff goes above the average level of the population 
after a bout, and then the proportion of this type will grow during the process (vice versa). But 
RD confuses the two different processes of individual replication and environmental selection. 
 
3.  CONTRASTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TWO MODELS  
 
We now take the RD model presented by J. M. Alexander (2003) as an example in the 
discussion below: 
He denotes the average fitness of cooperators and defectors as WC and WD respectively, and 
let denote the average fitness of the entire population. The values of WC, WD and  can be 
expressed in terms of the population proportions and payoff values as follows:  
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      DdCc WpWpW +=                                                 (5) 
      ),(),(0 DCFpCCFpFW dcC Δ+Δ+=                                (6) 
),(),(0 DDFpCDFpFW dcD Δ+Δ+=                                 (7) 
After a bout, the change of proportions between generations can be expressed as below: 
W
WWppp Cccc
)( −=−′                                       (8) 
W
WWppp Dddd
)( −=−′                                      (9)  
Assuming that the variation in the strategy frequency from one generation to another is 
small, these differences may be approximated by the differential equations 
W
WWp
dt
dp Ccc )( −=                                        (4) 
W
WWp
dt
dp Ddd )( −=                                       (10) 
Since the matrix assumes that T > R and P > S, it follows that W D > W C, and hence WD > 
> WC. This means that 
 
and 
 
Since the strategy frequencies for Defect and Cooperate in the next generation are given by  
                                 (11) 
                                 (12) 
 
Figure 1.  The Replicator Dynamical Model of the Prisoner's Dilemma 
 
Over time the proportion of the population choosing the strategy Cooperate eventually 
becomes extinct. Figure 1 illustrates one way of representing the RD model of the prisoner's 
dilemma, known as a state-space diagram. 
We can see from (4), (10) and the expression (5) and (6) of cW and W  in Part 2 that the core 
point still relates to the ideas of Taylor and Jonker who first proposed RD, which take aij to be 
Defect Cooperate 
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the number replicated of an i-strategist against a j-opponent. Following this assumption, the 
change of proportion following one strategy in a population depends upon the distribution of 
the fitness of individual following this strategy, while the individual fitness is just the result of 
the game. Thus it can be seen that the dynamical equation is not tenable in causal 
relationship—it employs the result of evolutionary game to explain the phenomena of 
evolution.  
Furthermore, since the two fundamental ESS conditions are valid in a broad sense, we have 
the following question in mind: if we do not use “the difference between the fitness of 
population  following a certain strategy and the average fitness of the entire population” in 
Replicator Dynamics, can we discuss the characteristics of the equation’s key (the proportion 
of individual following one strategy)? 
It can be seen from (8) and (9) presented above that Alexander defines fitness W as 
                          
t
t
t Q
QW 1+=                                   (13) 
where Q denotes the number of individuals. This is also the traditional approach of defining 
fitness in evolutionary biology. Then, according to Equation (5), (6), (7) and (13), Equation (8) 
can be rewritten as 
( ) ( )[ ]
1
0 ),(),(),(),(
Q
DDFpCDFpDCFpCCFpQp
p
pp dcdcd
c
cc Δ+Δ−Δ+Δ=−′    
(14)                             
where cp  and dp  denote the proportions of individuals following strategies C and D in 
current generation; cp′ and dp′  denote these proportions in the next generation respectively; 
0Q , 0DQ and 0CQ  respectively denote the numbers of the entire population, cooperators and 
defectors in the current generation; where 1Q , 1DQ and 1CQ  denote these numbers in the next 
generation. Since 111 CD QQQ +=  
( ) ( )),(),(),(),( 0000 DCFpCCFpQQDDFpCDFpQQ dcCCdcDD Δ+Δ++Δ+Δ+=  
then Equation (14) can be rewritten as: 
( cc pp −′ )∕ cp = 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )),(),(),(),(
),(),(),(),(
0000
0
DCFpCCFpQQDDFpCDFpQQ
DDFpCDFpDCFpCCFpQp
dcCCdcDD
dcdcd
Δ+Δ++Δ+Δ+
Δ+Δ−Δ+Δ
 
(15) 
The left side of Model (15) is the rate of change of the proportion following the strategy 
Cooperate after a bout, while parameters on the right side are determined before the game. 
Therefore, Model (15) accords with the demand of dynamical equation—initial conditions and 
boundary conditions decide subsequent changes over generations. 
Comparing Model (15) with the interpretation applying “the difference between the 
expected payoff value (or fitness) of population following a certain strategy and the average 
expected payoff value of the entire population”, we now discuss how Model (15) describes the 
dynamical process and whether it can be used to analyze the stability of the key (i.e. the 
proportion of individual follow one strategy). In Model (8), the left side expresses the rate of 
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change of the proportion following the strategy Cooperate after a bout, the right side includes 
two kinds of parameters determined before and after the bout. At the same time, the left side of 
Model (15) is the rate of change of the proportion follow the strategy Cooperate after a bout, 
while the parameters on the right side are determnied before the game. We can derive the fixed 
point from the differential equation of Model (15), and then discuss the stability of each fixed 
point with different parameters.  
Taking the RD model of the Prisoner's Dilemma as follows: 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )SpRpppPpTppp
PpTpSpRpp
p
pp
dcccdcdd
dcdcd
c
cc
+++++
+−+=−′ <0 
 
How will a population of individuals that repeatedly plays the Prisoner's Dilemma evolve? 
According to the model above, as the situation before a bout (at the right side of the equal mark) 
determines the rate of change of the proportion follow the strategy Cooperate after the bout (at 
the left side of the equal mark), we know that the proportion following the strategy Cooperate 
will decline over time, the proportion of the population choosing the strategy Cooperate 
eventually becomes extinct. Now we confirm that applying the change of number between 
generations to discuss the tendency and stability of the key (proportion) is feasible. In addition, 
there is no illogicality in this interpretation. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
The assumption that taking aij to be the number replicated of strategist i against j opponent in a 
bout of game is the principal precondition of applying RD to the interpretation of evolutionary 
mechanism. The principal notions of interpreting evolutionary mechanism by dynamical 
equation can be reduced to the point that the dynamical change of “the difference between the 
expected payoff value of population following a certain strategy and the average expected 
payoff value of the entire population” determines the change rate of population proportion 
following one strategy (type or trait) between generations, i.e. the rate of change of population 
proportion following one strategy (type or trait) between generations depends on the 
distribution of “fitness”. 
In fact, this approach misunderstands the essential concept of “dynamics” in evolution—the 
ratio of change of proportion during a bout depends on the result after a bout, which is used to 
explain the situation before the game.  
We have pointed out that, instead of using the difference between the fitness of population 
(or expected payoff value) following a certain strategy and the average fitness of the entire 
population, it is logical to apply the change of number between generations to analyze the 
tendency and stability of the key (proportion). 
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